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Abstract Prior work examining the antecedents of
capital structure for small and medium-sized enter-
prises in emerging markets is limited. This paper sheds
light on how the corporate governance mechanisms
adopted by firms on the newly established Growth
Enterprise Market (GEM) in China influence their use
of debt. We find that the financial leverage of GEM
firms is positively influenced by executives’ share-
holding and their excess cash compensation. Owner-
ship concentration appears to reduce leverage,
whereas the percentage of tradable shares increases
leverage. In contrast, institutional investors’ share-
holding does not influence the level of debt. Tradi-
tional factors such as tax and operating cash flow are
insignificant in explaining the debt levels among GEM
firms.
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compensation  Ownership structure  SMEs  China
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1 Introduction
Small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing
is a topic of significant research interest to both
academics and policy makers. This is because SMEs
play a vital role in providing employment and
sustaining economic growth in both developed and
emerging economies such as China (Du et al. 2015).
For example, according to the Chinese National
Bureau of Statistics, SMEs account for about 99 %
of the total number of firms in China and contribute
about 60 % of the country’s total gross industrial
output. Yet prior studies have documented the diffi-
culty of accessing finance as one of the biggest
constraints that impedes the growth SMEs around the
globe (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006; Beck et al.
2008). Challenges faced by SMEs in accessing
external financing are even more pronounced in
emerging economies such as China due to a weak
institutional environment, which has resulted in the
limited development of debt and equity markets for
small enterprises (Newman et al. 2012). A recent study
by Elston et al. (2016) suggests that informal capital in
the forms of personal savings, family funding, and
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household income is still predominantly used over
formal capital sources in the start-up phase, under-
scoring the slow transition in China from an emerging
to a modern economy.
In order to improve access to external finance for
growth SMEs, China has recently established a
Growth Enterprises Market (GEM) Board in 2009.
This board is similar to the NASDAQ in the United
States, AIM in the UK, EASDAQ in Europe, and
SESDAQ in Singapore. According to Lee et al. (2004),
the main reason for the establishment of the GEM
Board is to provide a mechanism for SMEs, most of
which are high-technology related, to raise funds and
therefore have the potential for high growth. The
establishment of the GEM is significant because it
increases access to external equity and improves the
governance structure of SMEs. For example, listing
shares on the GEM Board requires firms to reduce the
level of insider ownership, and increases levels of
ownership by outside investors such as mutual funds
and minority shareholders, thereby leading to a more
diffused ownership structure and better corporate
governance, which should in turn improve access to
external financing and enhance long-term
performance.
Recently, a cross-country study by Nofsinger and
Wang (2011) pointed out that there are information
asymmetries and moral hazard problems inherent in
the funding of SMEs. Although there is a growing
stream of research investigating capital structure
antecedents for larger listed firms and non-listed
SMEs in China and other emerging markets (Chen
2004; Du et al. 2015; Huang and Song 2006; Li et al.
2009; Liu and Tian 2012; Newman et al. 2012; Ko¨ksal
and Orman 2015), and listed SMEs in more advanced
economies (Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos 2015), prior
work has not examined the factors that drive the
capital structure of growth SMEs listed on SME
boards in emerging economies such as the GEM
Board. This group of SMEs is likely to differ from
larger listed enterprises and non-listed SMEs in a
number of ways. First, in comparison with larger listed
enterprises, which are predominantly former state-
owned enterprises, there is likely to be a higher level of
ownership concentration in SMEs on the GEM Board,
given that most of these firms originated as family-
owned businesses, in which the founder and their
family members continue to retain a significant
shareholding and involvement in the business (Ding
et al. 2010). As a result, this provides a unique
governance context compared to larger listed enter-
prises, where state ownership and control appear much
more pervasive. Second, compared to non-listed
SMEs, the involvement of shareholders from outside
the founding family ensures higher levels of trans-
parency in firms listed on the GEM Board. Typically,
there is better corporate governance in the form of
monitoring of management by outside shareholders
than for non-listed firms, due to stock listing require-
ments (Ding et al. 2010).
Given these unique differences between listed
SMEs, and both larger listed firms and non-listed
SMEs, the present study utilized data from the Chinese
GEM Board to examine the influence of corporate
governance mechanisms on the capital structure of
SMEs. In doing so, it makes a significant contribution
by examining whether the provision of managerial
incentives to align the interest of management and
shareholders, and outside involvement in ownership,
influences the capital structure of growth SMEs.
Although researchers have begun to examine the
determinants of SMEs capital structure based on
traditional theories of capital structure such as the
static tradeoff and pecking-order theories, prior work
has neglected the important role played by corporate
governance in influencing the use of debt (Dasilas and
Papasyriopoulos 2015), especially in emerging econo-
mies. This results from the fact that prior work has
typically focused on non-listed SMEs, where corpo-
rate governance is weak and outside ownership is
nonexistent (Du et al. 2015). Through accessing recent
data on growth SMEs, we are now able to examine the
role played by these mechanisms in facilitating an
improved access to external capital in the emerging
economy context, where GEM Boards have recently
been established. More specifically, we utilize agency
theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986) to
explain how corporate governance influences access to
external debt. Agency theory suggests that such
effective outside ownership and incentive structures
for the firm’s management will make the firm more
attractive to outside investors. Yet its relevance to
explain how such mechanisms influence SME’s use of
external financing in emerging economies has yet to be
investigated. Using a large dataset consisting of 384
Chinese listed SMEs on the GEM Board in the period
from 2009 to 2013, we employed system-GMM to
examine the effects of corporate governance on capital
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structure. Previous studies in the Chinese context have
used different statistical analysis encompassing
pooled OLS, fixed- and random-effect models (Chen
2004; Huang and Song 2006), which assume that
capital structure decisions are static. However, a more
realistic assumption would be that managers adjust
their financing mix due to internal changes or external
shocks (see Antoniou et al. 2008; Hui et al. 2006). To
account for such considerations and overcome the
problem of endogeneity, we use the dynamic estima-
tion technique to model a firm’s capital structure
choices. Our research also has important implications
for practitioners and academics in emerging econo-
mies. It will assist them to understand how corporate
governance mechanisms influence the growth SMEs’
use of external debt. This is important as access to
adequate debt financing has been shown to improve
performance outcomes among SMEs (Watson 2006;
Berger and Udell 1998).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 presents the institutional background of the
Chinese GEM Board. Section 3 reviews the literature
and develops our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our
data and methodology. Section 5 reports our results,
followed by policy implications in Sect. 6. Section 7
concludes.
2 The Chinese Growth Enterprises Market Board
On October 30, 2009, the Chinese Growth Enterprises
Market (GEM) Board (Chuang Ye Ban) opened
trading in Shenzhen, and the first 28 firms launched
their IPOs after a prolonged period of preparation.
This second board of the stock exchange was estab-
lished to provide smaller, fast-growing, technological,
and typically more ‘‘entrepreneurial’’ firms opportu-
nities for stock market public listings in a separate
venue with lower listing requirements compared to the
two main stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen.
The GEM Board is similar to NASDAQ, which was
originally comprised of mainly high-tech and phar-
maceutical companies that had a need for external
financing, but did not fulfill the requirements to be
listed on the main board New York Stock Exchange
(Lee et al. 2004). By June 2013, around 350 listed
firms were trading on the Chinese GEM Board
compared to over 2,100 listed firms on the main
board. Among the firms listed on the GEM, 77 are
from the telecommunication industry and 229 are from
the high-tech or technology-intensive manufacturing
industry. Most of them are high-growth and owner-
managed firms, still run by their founders (Ding et al.
2010).
Compared to the GEM Board, the main board
listing rules in China require more strict compliance as
regards pre-IPO size, business history, and profitabil-
ity. Specifically, for firms to seek listing, the GEM
Board requires a minimum pre-IPO total firm equity
capital of 20 million Chinese Yuan, 2 years of
business history, and positive net profits for the most
recent accounting year. In contrast, the main board
requires a minimum pre-IPO total equity of 30million,
3 years of business history with consecutive positive
net profits that accumulate to more than 30 million
Chinese Yuan, accumulated net operating cash flows
in the recent 3 accounting years to exceed 50 million
Chinese Yuan, or the accumulated total revenue to
exceed 300 million Chinese Yuan. As a result of
relatively less stringent disclosure requirements, there
are somewhat higher levels of information asymmetry
among firms on the GEM Board than among the firms
on the main board.
The firms listed on the GEM Board exhibit
different ownership and governance features com-
pared to firms on the main board. Almost all firms
on the GEM Board are under the control of private
investors or firms, whereas the majority of firms on
the main board are under control of the government
at the central or local level (Chen et al. 2009; Li
et al. 2011). Most of the main board listed firms are
carve-outs or spin-offs from existing state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) (Jiang et al. 2010), whereas
GEM firms are typically entrepreneurial firms under
the control of their founders. As of the end of 2013,
of 397 firms listed on the GEM Board, only 13 firms
were under government control. In comparison, over
half of the firms listed on the main board exchanges
were under government control. In GEM firms,
founding entrepreneurs and senior executives typi-
cally retain a significant percentage of shares on
stock market flotation, which can potentially reduce
principal–agent conflicts (Jensen and Meckling
1976). Typically, the percentage of stock owned
by executives and board members is much lower for
firms listed on the main board in China, especially
for government-controlled firms (Chen et al. 2009;
Jiang et al. 2010).
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3 Literature review and hypotheses development
3.1 Agency theory and capital structure
A large body of literature in corporate governance and
capital structure research utilized agency theory to
argue that the conflict of interest between managers
and shareholders of a firm affects corporate policy
choices such as capital structure decisions (Berger
et al. 1997). The overall thrust of agency theory is that
managers are self-serving and may have goals that
diverge from those of owners, which, if not monitored,
may lead them to engage in actions that come at the
expense of owner wealth maximization (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). Leverage decisions are among the
important corporate policy choices made by managers
that are prone to agency problems, as the level of
leverage affects the riskiness of the firm and may lead
the management to be displaced in the event of
takeover (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Although
recent work by Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos (2015)
and Haque et al. (2011) has examined the effects of
corporate governance on capital structure decisions in
Greece and Bangladesh, the subject remains under-
researched in the context of emerging economies. This
study is the first attempt to examine the effects of
corporate governance mechanisms on the leverage
decisions adopted by SMEs listed on the Chinese
GEM Board. We now briefly review the extant
literature linking corporate governance mechanisms
to leverage decisions from a managerial structural
power standpoint, highlighting the role played by
information asymmetry and monitoring, to ground our
hypothesis development.
Structural power, which is based on formal
organization structure and hierarchical authority,
constitutes the driving force behind the evolution of
organizations (Hambrick andMason 1984; Finkelstein
1992). This stream of literature contends that strong
managerial power exacerbates agency problems,
allows management to make suboptimal investment
decisions, and strategically increases their power to
derive benefits from control of their companies
(Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Liu and Jiraporn 2010).
Moreover, as dominance of the managerial team
strengthens, the firm experiences higher information
asymmetry, making it more difficult for shareholders
and bondholders to monitor managers’ actions. In
short, dominance of management leads to managerial
entrenchment and reduces reporting transparency.
However, previous studies examining the relationship
between managerial entrenchment and leverage deci-
sions have produced mixed results (see Stulz 1990;
Berger et al. 1997; Fama 1980). For example, Stulz
(1990) and Harris and Raviv (1988) present evidence
to support the view that entrenchment motives may
lead managers to increase leverage beyond the optimal
point, in order to increase their control and reduce
pressure from external shareholders. Conversely,
Fama (1980) notes that entrenched managers may
prefer less leverage than is optimal because of their
preference for lower firm risk to protect their under-
diversified human capital. In conclusion, it is acknowl-
edged that the prevailing view in the literature is that
self-serving managers do not make capital structure
decisions that maximize shareholder wealth.
Scholars therefore highlight the importance of good
internal corporate governance and monitoring mech-
anisms to alleviate the agency problem. For example,
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) and Gompers et al.
(2003) suggest that good corporate governance sys-
tems reduce agency costs and the cost of debt
financing. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) argue that
effective corporate governance results in an efficient
utilization of resources by managers, reduces default
risk, and thereby lowers the cost of debt. More
importantly, effective governance reduces informa-
tion asymmetry by ensuring the release of credible
financial information (Ajinya et al. 2005) and restrains
managers from using private information for their own
interests at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Myers and Majluf 1984). A study by
Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos (2015) established that
corporate governance structures and credit ratings
play a significant role in the capital structure decisions
of listed firms in Greece. However, they also found
that, in terms of SMEs, the influence of corporate
governance variables on capital structure appears to be
less pronounced than for larger firms. Dasilas and
Papasyriopoulos (2015) attributed these results to the
active involvement of owners in the management of
SMEs, which lessens the need for monitoring mech-
anisms. The studies of Wen et al. (2002), Berger et al.
(1997) have rendered some support for the association
between corporate governance and capital structure
decisions, but it should be noted that the results
obtained thus far have been mixed. Given the
relatively weak corporate governance systems in
538 W. Huang et al.
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emerging countries such as China, high ownership
concentration (La Porta et al. 1999), and the less
stringent requirements for listed firms, it is important
to apply the agency cost perspective in a different
context, i.e., growth SMEs on the GEM Board in
China, to provide more insight into how governance
factors such as ownership, compensation, and tradable
shares affect leverage decisions. The following section
presents a number of hypotheses that reflect how
managerial power and monitoring mechanisms may
influence capital structure decisions.
3.2 Hypotheses development
3.2.1 Managerial shareholding and capital structure
Past empirical research indicates that a firm’s
corporate financing policy is strongly influenced by
the agency problems it faces (Berger et al. 1997;
Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers and Majluf
1984). It is argued that conflict of interests over
financing policy between shareholders and managers
arise because managers may pursue goals that are
attractive to them. For example, the use of debt
reduces the need for external equity. Consequently,
in their quest to maintain the level of their
shareholding and avoid the dilution of managerial
shareholding and control, managers would typically
issue more debt than equity. This is particularly
relevant to the Chinese GEM firms that are typically
founder-controlled. A number of studies (e.g., Stulz
1990; Berger et al. 1997; Kim and Sorensen 2006)
find a positive relationship between managerial
shareholding and a firm’s debt ratio. Consistent
with earlier studies on larger listed firms, we expect
the proportion of managerial shareholding to be
positively associated with the SME debt ratio. This
leads us to the following hypothesis.
H1: The executives’ shareholding is positively
related to SMEs’ use of debt financing.
3.2.2 Cash compensation and capital structure
Prior literature provides empirical evidence of a strong
causal relationship between the compensation struc-
ture and debt policy of a firm (see Coles et al. 2006).
As cash compensation is immediate and certain, and
not subject to volatility compared to stock-based
compensation, it may be argued that cash compensa-
tion provides executives with an incentive to engage in
riskier decisions and implement more aggressive debt
policy with no consequences on their long-term
returns. Given that management power theory sug-
gests that excessive cash compensation is a proxy of
managerial structural power (Chen et al. 2011; Chung
et al. 2015), and debt enables managers to control
more resources, we expect a positive relationship
between excess cash compensation and the debt ratio
in a firm’s capital structure. This argument is partic-
ularly the case in emerging economies where the
corporate governance system is weak, and managers
with control rights have greater incentive to expand
their control of resources in order to tunnel resources
for private benefits (Liu and Tian 2012; Qian and
Yeung 2015). The above reasoning leads to the
following hypothesis:
H2 Executive excess cash compensation is posi-
tively related to SMEs’ use of debt financing.
3.2.3 Ownership concentration and capital structure
Prior research has shown that the ownership structure
of a firm has a palpable impact on its financing
decisions (Berger and Udell 2006). One dimension of
ownership structure that may affect capital structure
choice is ownership concentration. It is argued that
ownership concentration provides large shareholders
with control rights and incentives to pursue their own
personal interests by transferring or tunneling
resources out of the firm (Lin et al. 2012). Recent
studies by Liu and Tian (2012) and Qian and Yeung
(2015) report that excess control rights associated with
concentrated ownership and inefficient state-owned
banks in China allow firms to tunnel excess leverage
out of the firm. Researchers such as Faccio et al.
(2010) and Claessens et al. (2002) also find that
controlling shareholders’ use leverages without dilut-
ing their control over the firm to enable tunneling. This
type of agency problem is usually referred to as the
type II agency conflict or principal–principal conflict.
Further, considering that the firms in the GEM Board
are typically controlled by dominant shareholders and
founding entrepreneurs, we expect ownership concen-
tration to be positively associated with leverage. This
is because leverage places more resources at the
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disposal of the controlling shareholders in an envi-
ronment where corporate governance is weak (Liu and
Tian 2012; Qian and Yeung 2015), thereby enabling
tunneling activities by the large shareholders. The
above discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H3 Shareholding concentration is positively related
to SMEs’ use of debt financing.
3.2.4 Tradable shares and capital structure
Before the split-share structure reforms, Chinese
capital markets classified shares into tradable shares
and non-tradable shares, where non-tradable shares
were not publicly traded. The presence of non-tradable
shares hindered an efficient functioning of the stock
market, and the Chinese government has carried out a
split-share structure reforms since 2005 to gradually
transition from the non-tradable shares to tradable
shares over an extended period of time in order to
reduce the impact of non-tradable shares on stock
prices (Li et al. 2011). This reform has improved asset
valuation of firms and reduced the information asym-
metry between borrowers and lenders, as potential
lenders now have a fair value of the firm’s assets with
which to make leverage decisions. Higher percentage
of tradable shares also attract more diverse share-
holder base and increase tradable equity capitaliza-
tion. Recent work suggests that the split-share
structure reform has led to investor wealth gains from
risk sharing (Li et al. 2011). This suggests that the
conversion of non-tradeable shares to tradeable shares
may reduce credit risk and liquidity risk, allowing
firms to borrow more. This leads us to the following
hypothesis:
H4 The percentage of tradable shares as a proportion
of total common shares is positively related to SMEs’
use of debt financing.
3.2.5 Institutional investor shareholding and capital
structure
Nofsinger and Wang (2011) show that institutional
investors rely on the experience of entrepreneurs and
the quality of investor protection to reduce moral
hazard among start-up firms. In addition, Yuan et al.
(2009) report that mutual fund organizations in China
often help their portfolio companies prepare financial
forecasts, standardize their operations, and strengthen
their company image in the capital markets. In support
of such an assertion, Yuan et al. (2008) find that the
equity ownership by mutual funds has a positive effect
on firm performance. In particular, Firth et al. (2010)
also illustrate that mutual funds ownership increased
tradable shareholders’ bargaining power against state
shareholders during China’s split-share structure
reform. This suggests that the recent regulatory efforts
in China to promote mutual funds as a corporate
governance mechanism that pools the diffuse minority
interests of individual shareholders who are prone to
free-rider problems have met with some degree of
success. The improved information environment and
quality of external monitoring result from the involve-
ment of mutual funds in ownership may enhance
creditability and allow firms to borrow more. Active
trading by the mutual funds is also expected to lead to
more efficient pricing and higher sensitivity to market-
wide information (Chuang and Lee 2011). This leads
us to the following hypothesis:
H5 The percentage of institutional investor’s share-
holding is positively related to SMEs’ use of debt
financing.
4 Data and methods
We collected our data from the Chinese Stock Market
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database for the
financial years 2009–2013. Our original sample
includes all 397 listed firms on the GEM Board at
the end of year 2013. We excluded 13 firms whose
controlling shareholder is the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission of the
State Council (SASAC) as these firms have different
governance structures, share types, access to finance,
and risk profiles compared to firms controlled by
private investors (for a review, see Firth et al. (2009)
and Qian and Yeung (2015)). We note that all the
remaining firms are controlled by private investors and
have 100 % common equity issued as A-shares, in
which on average 38.6 % are tradable during the
sample period. We further drop observations with
negative equity book value resulting in a final sample
of 1214 observations.
We adopt both the market value-based financial
leverage ratio and the book value-based debt-to-assets
ratio as proxies for capital structure. Figures 1 and 2
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exhibit the distribution of these two variables across
the sample.
To adjust for non-normal distributions, we use the
log-transformed capital structure variables Log(LEV)
and Log(DE), denoting the market value- and book
value-based ratios, respectively, in our empirical
analysis. Prior studies show that corporate governance
choices are endogenous (for a review, see Wintoki
et al. (2012)). Following prior studies on capital
structure such as Antoniou et al. (2008) and Guney
et al. (2011), we adopt the two-step dynamic panel
System-GMM (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell
and Bond 1998) with Windmeijer (2005) bias-cor-
rected robust standard errors to simultaneously
account for the endogeneity of ownership, gover-
nance, and leverage. Our model includes firm fixed
effects ai and disturbance term eit as follows:
CSit ¼ ai þ gCSit1 þ bCGit þ cXit þ eit ð1Þ
We first difference all the variables to control for
unobserved heterogeneity ai and eliminate potential
omitted variable bias and use lagged values of the
governance variables, ownership variables, and other
firm characteristics as instruments for estimation. We
test for autocorrelation of the second-order AR(2) and
conduct the Hansen test of overidentification to ensure
the validity of our methods.
The dependent variable CSit refers to market value-
based financial leverage ratio Log(LEV) and book
value-based financial leverage ratio Log(DA). The
independent variables CGit refer to the corporate
governance variables. First, we measure managerial
power (Chen et al. 2011; Chung et al. 2015) using the
log of executives’ total shareholding Log(EXSH) and
the excessive log cash compensation to top executives
EX.Log(EXP). We estimate size- and industry-ad-
justed excessive executive compensation as a proxy for
managerial power and agency cost.1 Other CGit
variables are CON, shareholding concentration as the
total percentage shareholding of top 10 shareholders;
TRADE, the percentage of tradable A-shares in total
number of common shares2; INS, the percentage of
institutional investors’ shareholding. In line with
previous research, Xit denotes a group of control
variables including Log(MC), the log of total market
capitalization in millions of Chinese Yuan as a proxy
for size3; TAX, the percentage of corporate tax rate;
ROA, the return on asset; CF/Sales, the net operating
cash flow-to-sales ratio; BIND, the percentage of board
members who are independent; CEOD, a dummy that
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Fig. 1 Histogram of market value financial leverage = 100 *
book value of debt/(book value of debt? market capitalization)
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Fig. 2 Histogram of book value debt-to-assets percentage ratio
1 We first regress the log of the average of top 3 executives’
cash compensation in 1,000 s of Chinese Yuan Log(E.P) against
the log of firm market capitalization and a set of industry
dummies. EX.Log(E.P) is then calculated as the actual Log(E.P)
value minus the regression predicted value. The above calcu-
lation (excess compensation) reflects managerial power, which
may lead to a pursuit self-interests and exacerbate agency
problems (see Chen et al. 2011; Chung et al. 2015).
2 The tradable shares do not include the restricted A-shares or
B-shares which are locked up after the split-share structure
reform until trading restrictions are further removed on these
restricted shares over the ensuing years.
3 We also use the log of sales as an alternative proxy for firm
size to check for robustness, and the results not reported to
conserve space appear similar to the findings reported.
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equals to 1 if the CEO and the Chair of the board are the
same persons and 0 if not. ‘‘Appendix’’ provides more
detailed descriptions of variable measurement and
theory predictions.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of our
sample. All variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 %
to control for outliers. The average book value debt
ratio is around 20 % of their total assets. The average
market value debt ratio is 9.44 % of the firm value.
This is consistent with previous research, which
suggests that Chinese SMEs have lower levels of
long-term debt than firms from more developed
economies (Newman et al. 2012).
We also report a pairwise correlation matrix of the
variables in Table 2 to show basic univariate relation-
ships among the sample variables. We notice that the
leverage ratios are positively correlated with execu-
tives’ shareholding and cash compensation, and trad-
able shares percentage, and negatively correlated with
the shareholding concentration ratio. The relationship
between institutional shareholding and leverage
appears negative for the market value-based leverage
ratio and positive for the book value-based leverage
ratio.
5 Results
The effects of corporate governance variables on the
capital structure decisions of GEM firms are reported
in Tables 3, 4, and 5. The second-order serial corre-
lation tests AR(2) and Hansen tests suggest that our
GMMmodels are valid. In particular, the second-order
autocorrelation is insignificant.4 The null hypothesis
for Hansen tests that our instruments are valid cannot
be rejected in all specifications.
5.1 Managerial shareholding, cash compensation,
and debt ratio
Table 3 reports the impact of executives’ shareholding
and excess cash compensation on firms’ debt ratios.
Hence, the analysis focuses on type 1 agency conflict,
namely principal–agent conflict. The coefficients on
Log(EXSH) and EX.Log(EXP) are positive and
significant, indicating that executives’ shareholding
and cash compensation increase the financial leverage
of GEM firms, thereby supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2.
We note that the lagged leverage ratios are positively
Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max
LEV 1214 9.44 9.91 0.47 57.46
DA 1214 19.97 13.72 2.03 62.63
Log(LEV) 1214 1.78 1.00 -0.75 4.05
Log(DA) 1214 2.74 0.76 0.71 4.14
STLEV 1214 8.48 9.20 0.40 55.50
LTLEV 1214 0.93 1.66 0.00 9.94
Log(STLEV) 1214 1.65 1.02 -0.91 4.02
Log(LTLEV) 1000 -0.94 1.69 -6.84 2.44
LTD 1214 10.61 13.82 0.00 78.46
Log(EXSH) 1055 2.70 1.62 -7.46 6.37
Log(EXP) 1200 12.76 0.56 11.47 14.34
CON 1204 68.00 9.97 40.02 92.99
HHI 1200 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.41
TRADE 1212 38.60 18.42 0.00 100.00
INS 1162 23.86 19.35 0.07 74.50
Log(MC) 1214 7.78 0.82 4.62 9.83
TAX 1210 15.04 2.88 0.00 25.00
ROA 1214 8.20 5.59 -7.41 27.07
CF/Sales 1214 7.01 17.43 -38.28 59.58
BIND 1197 37.47 5.40 25.00 60.00
CEOD 1197 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 % to control for outliers
Variable definitions: LEV is the market value-based financial
leverage ratio; DA is the book value-based financial leverage
ratio; Log(LEV) is the log of financial leverage ratio; Log(DA)
is the log of debt-to-assets ratio; STLEV is the market value-
based short-term debt ratio; LTLEV is the market value-based
long-term debt ratio; Log(STLEV) and Log(LTLEV) are the
log-transformed short-term and long-term debt ratio. LTD is
the percentage of long-term debt in total debt; Log(EXSH) is
the log of executives’ total number of shareholdings.
Log(EXP) is the log of average of top 3 executives’ cash
compensation in 1,000 s of Chinese Yuan. CON is the
shareholding concentration ratio calculated as the total
percentage shareholding of top 10 shareholders. HHI is the
Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI), which is the sum of the
squared values of the percentage ownership of each of the top
ten shareholders. Trade is the percentage of tradable A-shares
in total number of common shares; INS is the percentage of
institutional investors’ shareholding; Log(MC) is the log of
total market capitalization in millions of Chinese Yuan as a
proxy for size; TAX is the percentage corporate tax rate; ROA
is the return on asset; CF/Sales is the net operating cash flow-
to-sales ratio; BIND is the percentage of board members who
are independent; CEOD is a dummy that equals to 1 if the CEO
and the Chair of the board are the same persons or 0 if not
4 The first-order autocorrelation is significant as expected due
to first differencing.
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and significantly related to the current period leverage
ratios. The coefficients indicate that the persistence of
capital structure is much lower when debt is measured
at market value, suggesting that the GEM firms are
more likely to use dynamic capital structures.
Our findings provide important insights on how
corporate governance influences the use of external
debt by firms on the GEM market. First, in line with
the Hypothesis 1, our findings suggest that the
management shareholding in Chinese SMEs results
in the greater use of debt finance by SMEs in China. As
the use of debt reduces the need for external equity, it
provides SME managers with the ability to issue more
debt without diluting ownership and control to pursue
their own private interest. One plausible explanation
for our findings is managerial entrenchment motives,
which may cause managers to increase leverage, in
order to inflate the voting power of their equity stakes,
reduce the possibility of takeover attempts, and retain
their jobs (Harris and Raviv 1988). Consequently, the
use of managerial shareholding as a means to mitigate
conflict of interests in SMEs in China appears
ineffective. These findings are in line with those from
earlier studies (Stulz 1990; Berger et al. 1997; Kim
and Sorensen 2006), which find a positive relationship
between managerial shareholding and a firm’s debt
ratio. Regarding the effects of excess cash compensa-
tion on leverage decisions, our results indicate that
firms with greater excess cash compensation for firm
management have higher levels of external debt and
hence Hypothesis 2 is supported. The findings are in
line with the management power theory (Chen et al.
2011; Chung et al. 2015), which suggests that debt
enables managers to control more resources to engage
in rent seeking in an environment where corporate
governance is weak.
5.2 Ownership and debt ratio
Table 4 shows the effect of ownership structure on
firms’ debt ratios. Hence, we focus on type 2 agency
conflict, namely principal–principal conflict between
firm controlling shareholders and minority sharehold-
ers. Contrary to Hypothesis 3, ownership concentra-
tion exerts a negative and significant influence on
firms’ debt ratios. In line with Hypothesis 4, the
percentage of tradable shares appears to be positively
related to the level of debt. Finally, contrary toT
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Hypothesis 5, the percentage of institutional investors’
shareholding does not influence the level of debt.
Contrary to Hypothesis 3, the finding that owner-
ship concentration has a negative and significant
influence on the debt ratio appears surprising. We
expected that concentrated ownership provides large
controlling shareholders with the ability to place more
resources at their disposal without diluting their
control over the firm to enable tunneling as docu-
mented in recent studies by Liu and Tian (2012) and
Lin et al. (2012). However, our results show that this is
not the case for GEM firms, which are different from
the main board listed firms given that their founders
maintain significant shareholdings. This suggests that
to the extent that information asymmetry exists
between managers and shareholders, ownership con-
centration facilitates active monitoring and mitigates
dilution of their ownership control, thereby limiting
managerial self-interest (Lins 2003; Jiang et al.
2010).5 In line with Hypothesis 4, our findings
demonstrate that the proportion of tradable A-shares
influences the ability of SMEs on the GEM to access
external sources of debt. This suggests that the equity
market reforms put in place since 2005 to transform
the Chinese stock market into a market that allocates
resources efficiently and strengthens corporate gover-
nance have been successful. The reforms have
enhanced the ability of SMEs to access external debt
through enlarging and diversifying their shareholder
base. In turn, the resultant risk sharing and trans-
parency in firms’ asset valuations influence lenders’
willingness to provide debt to SMEs (Li et al. 2011).
Finally, contrary to Hypothesis 5, we do not find
evidence that the presence of institutional investors
influences GEM firms’ use of debt. This may indicate
that institutional investors’ monitoring is generally
weak and professional investors do not enhance GEM
firms’ capacity to take on additional debt.
More generally, our findings are supportive of
recent work, which suggests that it is important to
understand how the institutional context in which
SMEs operate, particularly corporate governance,
influences their ability to access external sources of
debt (La Rocca et al. 2010; Ko¨ksal and Orman 2015).
Regarding the more traditional factors, especially tax
and operating cash flows, our results in Tables 3 and 4
illustrate that they have no influence on the debt levels
among GEM firms. Table 5 further indicates that
operating cash flows appear to influence the choice
between long-term versus short-term debt usage
conditional on the level of debt that is endogenously
Table 3 Executives’ influence on capital structure
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. Log(LEV) Log(DA) Log(LEV) Log(DA)
L.Log(LEV) 0.353*** (5.66) 0.253*** (2.97)
L.Log(DA) 0.809*** (8.69) 0.578*** (4.79)
Log(EXSH) 0.337*** (2.58) 0.215** (2.05)
EX.Log(EXP) 1.392*** (3.24) 0.818** (2.52)
Log(MC) -0.635*** (-9.06) 0.048 (0.69) -0.400*** (-4.54) 0.265*** (3.38)
TAX 0.012 (0.63) 0.007 (0.37) -0.004 (-0.20) 0.003 (0.16)
ROA -0.032*** (-2.92) -0.023*** (-2.93) -0.045*** (-3.81) -0.030*** (-3.49)
CF/Sales -0.001 (-0.50) 0.003 (1.47) -0.000 (-0.13) 0.002 (1.32)
BIND -0.010 (-0.92) -0.014* (-1.66) 0.004 (0.48) -0.002 (-0.29)
CEOD 0.692*** (2.78) 0.429** (2.12) 0.314*** (2.64) 0.212* (1.87)
Observations 741 741 741 741
# Firms 330 330 330 330
AR(2) 0.68 0.27 0.31 0.14
Hansen 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.17
System-GMM regressions. Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1. See Table 1 for variable definitions
5 We also test ownership concentration excluding the control-
ling shareholder and find similar results.
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determined. Tax remains an insignificant factor in all
models. This can be potentially attributed to on
average low profitability of growth firms due to high
investment (the average return on assets is just over
8 %). The benefit of tax shields can only be utilized
when firms are making sufficient pretax profit. In
addition, statistically speaking, the majority of firms
pay a 15 % marginal corporate tax rate (the mean tax
rate is 15.04 %), which is the preferential tax rate for
small and high-tech enterprises in China according to
its tax regulations. The insignificant influence of tax
rate on capital structure is partially expected given
almost no variation in the tax rate for our sample.
5.3 Robustness tests
The analysis so far has looked at the influence of
ownership and governance variables separately in
regression models to avoid potential multicollinearity
problems due to relationships among these variables
(see Huang and Wright 2015). In order to provide
greater insight, we use the ‘‘horserace’’ approach to
determine the relative importance of the competing
influences from different independent variables. The
full-model specification is reported in Table 5 models
1 and 2. We note that our findings are unaffected, yet
the t-statistics and coefficients are relatively smaller
compared to results in Tables 3 and 4 due to multi-
collinearity. The key finding here is that the variables
capturing managerial shareholding and incentives are
relatively stronger predictors of leverage than owner-
ship structure variables.
Prior studies indicate that SMEs are particularly
constrained in access to long-term debt financing,
which exposes the borrowing firm to potential rollover
difficulties and interest rate fluctuations that arise from
the use of short-term debt (Ko¨ksal and Orman 2015).
We define long-term debt as that which has maturity of
over a year and short-term debt as that which has
maturity of less than 1 year. Figure 3 shows that the
debt utilized by GEM firms in our sample is mostly
short term. This is in line with the international
evidence documented by Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksi-
movic (1999) that the majority of debt in developing
economies is short-term debt.
We conduct further analysis on firm choice of long-
term debt versus short-term debt conditional to the
determined level of total debt in Table 6 by adopting
random-effects Tobit regressions given the distribu-
tion of the long-term debt ratio. The dependent
variable LTD in Table 6 denotes the percentage of
long-term debt as a proportion of total debt. Consid-
ering the level of financial leverage is an endogenous
decision, we control for the lagged leverage ratios in
our models. Our results suggest that irrespective of the
market value- or book value-based leverage ratios, the
use of long-term debt at given level of financial
leverage is negatively related to ownership
Table 5 Full-model robustness tests
Model (1) (2)
Dep. Var. Log(LEV) Log(DA)
L.Log(LEV) 0.108 (1.55)
L.Log(DA) 0.394*** (3.41)
Log(EXSH) 0.235*** (3.24) 0.128*** (2.71)
EX.Log(EXP) 0.688*** (2.61) 0.247 (1.07)
CON -0.017** (-2.52) -0.012** (-2.49)
TRADE 0.004** (1.99) -0.000 (-0.15)
INS 0.004 (0.69) 0.007 (1.60)
Log(MC) -0.584*** (-6.63) 0.160** (2.18)
TAX -0.006 (-0.28) 0.005 (0.29)
ROA -0.008 (-0.65) -0.017** (-2.19)
CF/Sales -0.003 (-1.13) 0.003 (1.47)
BIND -0.001 (-0.06) 0.001 (0.16)
CEOD 0.530*** (3.16) 0.335** (2.33)
Observations 727 727
# Firms 326 326
AR(2) 0.27 0.22
Hansen 0.17 0.26
System-GMM regressions. Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1. See Table 1 for variable
definitions
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
D
en
si
ty
0 20 40 60 80
ltd
Fig. 3 The percentage of long-term debt in total debt
546 W. Huang et al.
123
concentration. This further supports the agency theory
view of debt financing. We also note that CEO duality
and cash flow-to-sales ratio matters to firms choices
between short-term and long-term debt. Other factors
in our model do not appear to be statistically
significant.
6 Policy implications
Our findings have important practical implications for
senior managers and policy implications for policy
makers. First, from a managerial standpoint, our
findings that managerial shareholding and cash com-
pensation are positively related to leverage imply that
incentive schemes designed to align the interest of
managers to that of the shareholders are effective in
increasing the leverage of SMEs on the GEM. In order
to improve access external debt, managers might
consider increasing the use of such incentives. Second,
the negative relationship found between ownership
concentration and leverage implies that dominant
shareholders perform an efficient internal monitoring
role in GEM firms to protect their equity stakes and
control from being diluted. Ownership concentration
appears to be an important monitoring mechanism in
an environment of weak legal protection. Third,
institutional investors in China appear to have no
influence on the adoption of leverage policies of the
GEM firms, which suggests that they play no active
monitoring role. This is contrary to the results
documented in advanced market economies, which
indicate that institutional investors are efficient mon-
itors of corporate performance (Yuan et al. 2008).
These results suggest that policy makers should
provide additional support and training for institu-
tional investors, to ensure that they play more of an
active role in monitoring management. Fourth, our
finding that the proportion of tradeable shares
improves access to external debt implies that the
tradability of shares has improved asset valuation of
SMEs and reduced the information asymmetry
between borrowers and lenders, thereby facilitating
better leverage decisions by the lenders. In order to
improve access to external debt for SMEs, policy
makers might consider introducing regulations requir-
ing firms listed on the GEM Board to further reduce
the ratio of non-tradeable shares to tradable shares.
Finally, our findings have important policy implica-
tions in light of falling economic growth in China, and
the volatility experienced by the Chinese stock market
in 2015. Such events highlight the need to improve the
corporate governance of SMEs in order to facilitate
their ability to access external debt from increasingly
risk-averse lenders. As highlighted above, this may be
done by strengthening the role played by institutional
investors and increasing the number of tradeable
shares.
Despite the study’s significant contribution, it is
important to point out a number of limitations. First, as
our study only utilized data from Chinese growth
enterprises, we are unable to confirm whether our
findings are generalizable to other emerging markets
where the institutional environment may be different
from that in China. Future research may investigate
whether the corporate governance mechanisms oper-
ationalized in the present study also improve firms’
access to debt in other emerging economies. Second,
due to data limitations, it was difficult to establish the
differential effects of corporate governance mecha-
nisms on improving access to debt raised from banks
versus the corporate bondmarket. Future research may
seek to do this. Third, this study attempted to identify
the influence of different governance variables on
Table 6 Determinants of the long-term debt percentage
Models (1) (2)
Dep. Var. LTD LTD
L.log(LEV) 0.609 (1.03)
L.log(DA) 0.913 (1.13)
Log(EXSH) 0.045 (0.12) 0.029 (0.08)
EX.Log(EXP) 0.186 (0.14) 0.174 (0.13)
CON -0.184*** (-2.61) -0.185*** (-2.63)
INS 0.026 (0.87) 0.026 (0.86)
Log(MC) 1.486 (1.18) 1.409 (1.12)
TAX -0.245 (-1.14) -0.252 (-1.17)
ROA -0.117 (-0.91) -0.124 (-0.97)
CF/Sales 0.085*** (2.82) 0.087*** (2.88)
BIND -0.061 (-0.55) -0.064 (-0.57)
CEOD -3.166** (-2.33) -3.223** (-2.37)
Observations 727 727
# Firms 326 326
Random-effects Tobit regressions. The dependent variable is
LTD, the percentage of long-term debt in total debt.
Coefficients on year dummies are omitted. z-statistics in
parentheses
*** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1. See Table 1 for variable
definitions
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SMEs’ leverage decisions, and failed to explicitly
investigate whether debt has beneficial impact on
SMEs performance. Future research might investigate
whether corporate governance mechanisms differen-
tially influence the access to different sources of debt
and whether such access to debt has a resultant
influence on the performance of SMEs.
7 Conclusion
Utilizing data from publicly traded SMEs on the
Chinese Growth Enterprises Market, this paper exam-
ined how the corporate governance mechanisms
adopted by SMEs influence their financing decisions.
Our sample firms are mostly high-growth, technology-
intensive, and more ‘‘entrepreneurial’’-type SMEs that
have successfully made their IPOs since the estab-
lishment of the second board stock market in China in
2009. We found that the financial leverage of GEM
firms is positively influenced by executives’ share-
holding and cash compensation. Ownership concen-
tration appears to reduce leverage, whereas the
percentage of tradable shares increases leverage.
Institutional investors’ shareholding does not influ-
ence the level of debt. Traditional factors such as tax
and operating cash flow were found to be insignificant
in explaining the debt levels of GEM firms, highlight-
ing the importance to consider corporate governance
as an important antecedent of capital structure.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unre-
stricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
See Table 7.
Table 7 Measurement of dependent and independent variables
Variables Measures Sign Theoretical justification
LEV Market value-based debt ratio, LEV = book value of debt/
(market capitalization ? book value of debt)
DA Book value-based debt-to-assets ratio
LTD The percentage of long-term debt
CEOD CEO duality dummy. CEO as chair = 1; otherwise = 0 ? Agency theory
CON The total percentage of shares held by top 10 shareholders ± Agency theory
Log(EXSH) The total of executives’ shareholding number. We use log
transformation to winsorize the data.
? Agency theory
EX.Log(EXP) Size- and industry-adjusted cash compensation for the top 3
executives. Defined as the excessive cash compensation. We
use log transformation to winsorize the data.
? Agency theory
TRADE The percentage of tradable shares in total number of shares ? Pecking order/tradeoff
INS The percentage shareholding by institutional investors ? Tradeoff/agency theory
ROA Return-on-assets ratio _ Pecking order/tradeoff
Tax The corporate tax rate ? Tradeoff
BIND The percentage of board members who are independent – Agency theory
CF/Sales The operating cash flows-to-sales ratio – Pecking order/tradeoff
Log(MC) The log of market capitalization (MC). – Pecking order/tradeoff
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